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The huddle/tangle hypothesis of regional integration: the 
case of the European Union and its enlargement 
 
Elias Sanidas  
 
Abstract   
Regional integration can be a process that resembles that of a huddle/tangle. Some countries 
might be more prone or keen or able to integrate than others; however there is no guarantee 
that this process will be smooth through time. On the contrary, integrating countries seem to 
hover and spin around some main stronger economically countries and form a tangle. Was 
there a pattern of integration for the various stages of new countries joining the EU? Was the 
initial momentum created by the founding countries a situation that has never changed during 
the last 40 years or so? Is there any tendency for sub-integration, especially for some specific 
groups of countries? This paper focuses on national exports as a tool of evidence that joining 
the EU is not a solution to long term economic growth unless a strategy is adopted to 
counteract the inherent tendencies of the huddle/tangle process. Various methods will be used 
to bring this evidence forward and answer the questions above.  
 






Europe is a much diversified region from several points of view, such as cultural, 
historical, and political. From an economic perspective, the European Union (EU) of 
25 nations is also diversified in terms of GDP, foreign trade, standard of living and so 
on. Since World War II, as a consequence of the split between West and East, and as a 
consequence of the reconstruction of Western Europe we can notice the following 
tendencies in the EU. First, Germany (together with Belgium and Netherlands) has 
emerged as the pivotal country around which European development
1 takes place. 
Second, Germany constitutes the economic centre of Europe from a gravitational or 
geographic point of view. Third, east and west, or north and south still exist in Europe 
and the road is long for real economic (and political or social) integration. 
 
                                                 
1 As we will remark further below, Germany and its immediate western neighbours have been an 
important centre of economic development since the Middle Ages.   2
These tendencies will form the main thesis of this paper. Some evidence will be 
provided here, however more research is needed to confirm the reached conclusions. 
A simple remark will provide preliminary confirmation. Germany is surrounded by 
the largest number of countries along its boundaries (land or sea), has the biggest 
population, and its neighbours collectively have the largest population. Table 1 shows 
the names and number of neighbours for each European country shown; as can be 
seen, Germany stands out in this comparison.  
 
Table 1  The neighbours for some European countries 








1 Portugal  10  Spain,  Morocco,  USA, 
Canada 
4 total, 1 
European 
Sea, 1 land 
2 Spain  40.5  Portugal,  France, 
Morocco, Algeria, Italy 
5 total, 3 
European 
2 land, 3 sea 
3 France 61  Spain,  UK,  Belgium, 
Germany, Switzerland, 
Italy, Algeria, Tunisia 
8 total, 6 
European 
5 land, 3 sea 
4 Ireland  4.1  USA,  Canada,  UK, 
France 
4 total, 2 
European 
4 sea 
5 UK  60.5  Ireland,  France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, 
Norway, Denmark, 
Germany, USA, Canada 
9 total, 7 
European 
9 sea 
6 Belgium  10.5  Netherlands,  Germany, 
France, UK 
4 total  3 land, 1 sea 
7 Netherlands  16.5  Denmark,  Germany, 
Belgium, UK 
4 total  2 land, 2 sea 
8 Germany  82.4  France,  UK,  Belgium, 
Netherlands, Denmark, 
Sweden, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Austria, 
Switzerland, Italy 
(despite the narrow 
Austrian land in 
between) 






9 Switzerland  7.5  France,  Germany, 
Austria, Italy 
4 total, all 
European 
4 land 




11 total, 9 
European 
4 land, 7 sea 
11 Austria 8.2  Switzerland,  Germany, 
Czech Rep., Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, 
Italy 
7 total  All land   3
 
The neighbours of each country have the following significance. First, they offer and 
are part of an immediate economic market depending ultimately on the population and 
type of these neighbours; for example, are these neighbours already economically 
advanced, or were they former communist countries, or are they industrialized? And 
so on. Thus we can see from Table 1 that Germany plus its surrounding countries 
have a total population, hence potential market, of about 310 million people. Second, 
through historical, political and cultural links, the neighbours reinforce the common 
market of the central country. Thus, Germany in particular has neighbours with very 
close such links despite many European wars
2.   
 
Germany’s position in Europe is also a central gravitational position: it is 
approximately at equal distance from all other European countries (their capital can be 
considered as their representative point). Thus, it is obvious when we look at the map 
that France, or the UK, or Italy does not have this position. This geographical 
advantage of Germany can offer more economic spillovers, mainly because other 
countries which are not the centre are disadvantaged by further away situated markets. 
Thus for example, historically, a country like Portugal or Greece certainly has not 
possessed the same potential power in penetrating foreign economic markets as the 
Czech Republic has. 
 
It can easily be verified that the economic development of Europe since the industrial 
revolution has started more intensively in England at the end of the 18th century and 
that the following area as is delimited by the lines linking the cities of Liverpool, Paris, 
                                                 
2 Europe has been the centre of numerous wars through the history. However, these wars have also 
reinforced common racial, cultural, political, and economic trends. For example, most neighbours of 
Germany are of Germanic background and language, e.g. Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, and so on.   4
Lyon, Marseille, Venice, Vienna, Prague, Stockholm, Amsterdam, and York has been 
the main motor of manufacturing and economic development of Europe in the last 
250 years. In this area, Germany is included in its totality. We will refer to this area 
and line as the C1 centre of Europe
3. A similar but smaller region has been suggested 
by other researchers, the so called ‘blue banana’ that includes the southwest part of 
England, Belgium and Netherlands, the east and south part of France, the west part of 
Germany, the northern part of Italy and a small north east part of Spain (Hospers, 
2003). As Heindenreich (1998) says this ‘blue banana’ was already prominent in 
Europe from the Middle Ages.  
 
In the second section some propositions will be formulated regarding the 
huddle/tangle (HT) hypothesis of regional integration; the third section will provide 
quantitative evidence regarding the HT assertion; and the fourth section will draw 
conclusions and discuss policies.  
 
2  The huddle/tangle hypothesis of regional integration 
We can now use the conclusions reached in the previous section to construct and 
propose our hypothesis of regional integration in Europe. Before we announce this 
proposition we also must refer to an important economic postulate regarding 
economic development, namely that of poles of growth as elaborated by scholars such 
as Perroux, Rostow, and others (see Sanidas, 2005 for a brief account of this 
postulate). For example, Rostow (1990, p. 469) says: 
…In short, a modern economy is not driven forward by some sort of productivity factor 
operating incrementally and evenly across the board. It is driven forward by the complex 
direct and indirect structural impact of a limited number of rapidly expanding leading sectors 
                                                 
3 A similar core region to C1 is the greater Shanghai core in China (see Sanidas, 2006a).   5
within which new technologies are being efficiently absorbed and diffused. And it is this 
process of technological absorption that substantially generates, directly and indirectly, the 
economy’s flow of investment via the plowback of profits for plant and equipment, enlarged 
public revenues for infrastructure, and enlarged private incomes for residential housing… 
 
The rapidly expanding leading sectors to which Rostow refers were essential to the 
economic development of countries such as England, Netherlands, and Germany. For 
example the textiles and clothing industry in England, the oil industry in Holland, and 
the chemical one in Germany have lead these countries to higher economic 
development at different points of time. Each one of the countries and subregions 
included in the C1 core have a long history of manufacturing performance in several 
sectors and groups of firms like Philips in Netherlands.     
 
Hospers (2003) refers to three building blocks of theoretical development in order to 
explain the existence and changes in the growth poles in Europe. Based on the 
Schumpeterian premises of creative destruction, he refers to structural change theory 
(mainly proposed by Fourastiè) which accounts for intersectoral changes due to 
technological change. The third building block is the agglomeration theory ( as 
proposed by Perroux and Myrdal) built around leading firms and industries and their 
spread effects or backlash effects; according to this theory we have the “Matthew” 
effect which suggests that the rich (core) becomes richer, while the poor (periphery) 
becomes poorer. Hospers (2003) uses all this theoretical background to suggest that 
the already mentioned ‘blue banana’ greater region of the EU will continue to be the 
centre of economic development in Europe. 
   6
The concentration of wealth (not only economic) in the core C1 is evidence of the 
theoretical postulates as described briefly above. Thus, if we take the small version of 
this core, the ‘blue banana’ (Hospers, 2003), in 1996 40 % of the EU population lived 
inside that ‘banana’ with many large and medium size cities; the regions within that 
‘blue banana’ have higher income per capita than the rest of Europe, have a well-
developed physical and telecommunications infrastructure, and they supply most of 
cultural and educational products such as exhibitions, conferences, universities and so 
on. Needless to say there are similar pockets of wealth in some other parts of Europe, 
but the ‘blue banana’ or our core C1 has the highest concentration or density of 
wealth and economic or social development in the EU.      
 
From this brief theoretical background we can infer that a strong regional integration 
is one that propagates economic development from the centre or pole to the periphery 
in a consistent and positive way. The following propositions capture this idea. 
Proposition 1: Economic regional integration can take place through the 
existence of a pole of growth –a particular region or country- that attracts an 
exceptional economic and social activity which in turn leads to the asymmetric 
development of the pole in relation to the periphery. 
 
Proposition 2: The degree of asymmetric development depends on several 
factors: historical background, age of formal integration, distance from the 
centre of the core, and differences in size between the country/subregion of the 
core and the peripheral country/subregion. 
   7
Proposition 3: If the central country/subregion of the core has been the formal 
hub of integration for a long time before new members join in, and if this 
country/subregion is very large in relation to the remaining or peripheral 
countries/subregions then we have the huddle/tangle hypothesis: an over 
concentration (anarchistic) of economic growth translated into much higher 
exports of the central country/subregion.     
 
Proposition 4: Unless properly regulated and monitored this type of regional 
integration (as per proposition 3) cannot be beneficial to the most distant 
peripheral countries/regions. The only solution would be to create another 
centre of another potential core.  
 
To theoretically support these propositions we can use a system of two differential 
equations as per Sanidas (2006a) analysis
4: 
11 12 x xy α α =+   and  21 22 y xy α α =+         ( 1 )  
A core country’s exports growth rate (x  ) depends on this country’s level of exports x 
(with a positively signed coefficient) and on the level of the non-core country’s level 
of exports y (also with a positively signed coefficient, because more exports from the 
non-core nation means more economic growth for the latter, hence more imports from 
the core country) as per system (1). The coefficients of the non-core country’s exports 
rate of growth differential equation are also positively signed. This has as a 
consequence a probable saddle equilibrium point in the long run with both exports 
reaching some high point in the distant future ceteris paribus. This point can be such 
that the core country’s exports can be 95% of the sum of both countries’ exports. 
                                                 
4 All the details of the solutions to this system can be found in Sanidas (2006a).   8
Consequently “Matthew’s effect” is verified, thus confirming the huddle/tangle 
hypothesis promoted in the present paper. 
 
3 Quantitative  evidence  for the validation of the huddle/tangle hypothesis 
Exports can be considered to be a good overall representation of a country’s economy. 
A vast literature on this topic (e.g. Awokuse, 2006; Carbaugh, 2004) shows that 
exports are very important in promoting economic growth and development. In this 
paper exports will be used to quantify the integration position
5  of each European 
country.  
 
The data are available from the ITC internet site.
6 We have thus a matrix of each 
European country’s exports to all other European countries in terms of US$ (see data 
in Appendix). In order to standardise these data, export ratios are calculated (for 
example, Hungary’s exports to Germany constitute about 36% of Hungary’s total 
exports, and so on). Only the exports data will be used in the analysis below, since 
what are exports for one country it is also imports for its trade partner (if the 
difference between f.o.b. and c.i.f. is considered).  
 
3.1  The central role of Germany 
In this sub-section we will show more explicitly how Germany is the central nation in 
terms of exports and imports. The average (across exporters) percentage of exports 
towards each country is an important indication. Thus Germany stands out with 18% 
exports on average across countries directed to this country. The countries that receive 
most of the exports after Germany are Italy (8%), the UK (7%), France (7%), the 
                                                 
5 Integration position is defined as the position of a country in relation to a sub-cluster or any other 
group considered in the analysis.  
6 For Portugal and Ukraine, the source is the UN publication (see references).   9
Netherlands (4%), and Belgium (4%)
7. These 6 countries together received about 50% 
of all European countries’ exports in 2003. Furthermore, the countries that export a 
very high percentage of their exports to Germany are those that are its immediate 
neighbours. All this is a preliminary support for our idea about the significance of C1 
core whose centre is Germany.  
 
In this subsection we will use a simple OLS regression to uncover the importance of 
the C1 core.  The main argument is that exports of European countries depend on how 
these countries are integrated with the centre of the C1 core which is Germany, and 
with the complement of C1 core which is the addition of Belgium, plus Netherlands, 
plus France, plus Italy
8 (abbreviated as Benefrit). Thus, the higher the export ratio of a 
given country to either Germany or Benefrit is (as in relation to all other countries), 
the higher the total exports of this country are. Note that the UK is not included in this 
group Benefrit because it seems that this country has moved away from the original 
C1 core delineation and is closer to the USA and Scandinavian connection
9. 
 
In addition, if a country is further away from the C1 core, if it belongs to a 
disadvantaged region, and if it does not belong to another major core, then this 
country’s exports are lower than if it did not have either of these 3 characteristics. 
Country candidates that belong to this category are the Balkan nations, plus Portugal. 
Finally, exports are as usual also dependent on the size of the country in terms of its 
national income (GNI is used here). The data for this regression are shown in Table 2.  
                                                 
7 Even if we consider the relationship between exports and GDP, Germany still exports much more 
than any other country with a similar size in GDP (such as France, the UK, and so on). 
8 These are the initial countries of the EU. 
9 There is probably another core of a minor significance whose centre is the axis UK plus USA. The 
countries that seem to belong to this core are at least Ireland (40% of its exports are exported to this 
core), Norway (31.5%), and Sweden (20.5%).  
   10
Table 2  The huddle/tangle regression data  
country 
 




benefrit     balk 
Austria 76.4  0.342 192 0 0.181 0 
Belarus 9  0.046 13.5 2.83 0.072 0 
Belgium 233.3  0.209 237 0 1.472 0 
Bulgaria 6.37  0.127 14 2.87 0.311 1 
Czech R  47.31  0.381 56 5.00 0.16 0 
Croatia 5.61  0.13 20 3.31 0.337 1 
Denmark 54.38  0.198 163 0 0.154 0 
Esthonia 5.28  0.089 6 2.04 0.073 0 
Finland 47.11  0.126 124 0 0.16 0 
France 323.34  0.161 1362 0 0.904 0 
Germany 648.89  4 1876 0 0.298 0 
Greece 12.2  0.139 124 0 0.21 1 
Hungary 40.47  0.356 54 4.93 0.188 0 
Ireland 85.62  0.086 90 0 0.298 0 
Italy 261.25  0.15 1101 0 0.752 0 
Latvia 2.77  0.155 8 2.29 0.095 0 
Lithuania 6.89  0.103 13 2.78 0.132 0 
Netherlands 211.44  0.246 378 0 1.132 0 
Norway 62.57  0.135 176 0 0.254 0 
Poland 49.8  0.346 177 7.92 0.209 0 
Portugal 26.8  0.181 109 0 0.265 1 
Romania 16.5  0.167 42 4.45 0.392 1 
Russia 85.2  0.075 307 0 0.192 0 
Slovakia 21.454  0.315 21 3.37 0.165 0 
Slovenia 12.079  0.244 20 3.31 0.225 1 
Spain 130.68  0.145 597 0 0.425 0 
Sweden 91.699  0.106 232 0 0.191 0 
Switzerland 92.422  0.227 264 0 0.242 0 
Turkey 39.1  0.191 173 0 0.213 1 
UK 268.366  0.115 1511 0 0.297 0 
Ukraine 20  0.037 38 0 0.072 0 
 
Sources and notes: The exports data used in this regression are compiled from the ITC, available on 
internet, for the year 2003 (except for Portugal and Ukraine, for which exports are extracted from the 
UN publication ). For GNI, the World Bank site provided the data for 2002. The variable “exports’ is in 
US$ billions; the variable “germany” is expressed in ratios (for example, Poland’s exports to Germany 
constitute 0.346, or 34.6% of this country’s total exports); the variable “gni” is in US$ billions; the 
variable “easteu” is expressed in US$ billions, is calculated as “gni” of an Eastern (zero otherwise) 
European country raised to the power 0.4 (this value is determined empirically in an iterative way), and 
shows the impact of having been previously belonged to another block of integration; finally the 
variable “balk” is a dummy taking the value of 1 for the Balkan countries plus Portugal and 0 otherwise. 
The very small countries either in terms of population or in terms of exports were excluded for this 
regression: Bosnia, FYROM, Cyprus, Malta, Luxemburg, and Iceland. 
 
Some comments are necessary for the construction of these series. First, the ratios of 
exports to Germany in column 2 (variable “germany”) of Table 2 necessitate a value 
of exports to Germany from …Germany; this is estimated iteratively from the 
regression to be 4 (see Table 2). Thus, for Germany the value 4 shows the reciprocity   11
of exports: the higher the exports of other countries to Germany are the higher of 
Germany’s exports to these countries are. We will call this value the huddle/tangle 
(HT) effect of the C1 core on Germany. In the same way, the value 3 in the formula 
below is estimated for the 4 countries of the variable Benefrit; for example for 
Belgium: HT of Belgium= exports ratio of exports of this county to the other 3 
countries 0.368 plus 0.368*3= 1.47; and so on for the other 3 countries.  
 
The results of this regression are shown in Table 3, the HT effect in Table 4, and the 
analysis of residuals in Table 5. 
Table 3  Regression results 
  germany gni  easteu  benefrit  balk  R
2 
Coefficient 84.88  0.145  -4.23  144.43  -33.49  0.995 
t-statistic 23.3  25.4  -5  21.1  -7.5   
 
Table 4  The HT effect 
C1 country  Germany  France  Netherlands Italy  Belgium 
Total exports  648.89  323.34  211.44  261.25  233.3 










HT effect %  52.3% 40.4%  77.3%  41.6  91.1% 
 
All coefficients are highly significant and have the right signs and magnitudes. 
According to these results the HT effect can be easily appreciated. Thus, for example, 
for Germany, out of her total US$648.89 billions of exports, US$339.52 or 52.3% are 
due to this effect (variable “germany”) and the remaining due to its market size 
(“gni”). The variable “gni” indicates that 14.5% of GNI can be expected to be 
exported. The variable “easteu” indicates that for example for Poland 4.23*7.92 = 
33.5 US$ billions are “lost” exports due to this country’s affiliation with the ex 
communist block. The variable “balk” indicates that all Balkan countries plus   12
Portugal exported US$33.49 billions
10 less in 2003 than they could have done if their 
integration position relative to the core was not disadvantageous.        
 
Table 5  Residuals analysis 
 
Country  Actual Predicted  Residuals
Austria 76.4  79.1 -2.7
Belarus 9  2.7 6.3
Belgium 233.3  232.4 0.9
Bulgaria 6.37  5.3 1.1
Czech R  47.31  38.9 8.4
Croatia 5.61  7.7 -2.1
Denmark 54.38  59.3 -5.0
Estonia 5.28  8.7 -3.4
Finland 47.11  48.3 -1.2
France 323.34  322.2 1.1
Germany 648.89  648.6 0.3
Greece 12.2 22.0 -9.8
Hungary 40.47  40.2 0.2
Ireland 85.62  56.9 28.8
Italy 261.25  264.8 -3.5
Latvia 2.77  16.2 -13.5
Lithuania 6.89  15.0 -8.1
Netherlands 211.44  214.4 -3.0
Norway 62.57  68.1 -5.6
Poland 49.8  47.2 2.6
Portugal 26.8  30.2 -3.4
Romania 16.5  15.9 0.6
Russia 85.2  74.5 10.7
Slovakia 21.454  35.7 -14.2
Slovenia 12.079  3.7 8.4
Spain 130.68  151.1 -20.4
Sweden 91.699  66.1 25.6
Switzerland 92.422  87.3 5.2
Turkey 39.1  33.9 5.2
UK 268.366  265.7 2.7
Ukraine 20  17.5 2.5
 
Most residuals are satisfactory but there are some exceptions for which we suspect the 
reasons. For Russia the large positive error is due to its increasing role as an oil 
products exporter. For Ireland and Sweden we know that their Atlantic connection is 
                                                 
10 Sanidas (2006b) has found that this effect is about US$35 billions based on the analysis of the 2000 
largest companies in the world. This result obviously confirms the result in the present paper.    13
very strong (see also a previous footnote); for example Ireland exports more than 20% 
of its total exports to the USA
11. 
 
An important remark will close this section. The foregoing analysis is in some ways 
an indirect application of the gravity model for international trade which explicitly 
takes into account distances between trading nations and relative sizes in economies. 
However there is an essential difference between our regression and any gravity 
model regression. The latter does not distinguish between a core of clustered countries 
and peripheral countries like the present model does. For the gravity model all 
countries have an equal weight in terms of their mutual distances and sizes; this is not 
true here.  
 
3.2   Further supportive quantitative evidence 
Cluster analysis
12 will now be used to arrive at some more formal results regarding 
the spontaneous clustering process of most European countries. We will use export 
ratios again to gauge the links between countries when these form groups of common 
interest.  Figure 1 shows the results; the countries Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bosnia, 
FYROM, Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, and Turkey are excluded, as these 
countries do not add more information to the picture, for different reasons each one of 
them. Thus, when these countries are included they seem to be grouped in areas of 
non-relevance. These countries –except Germany- also seem to be the least integrated 
in the C1 core. If Germany is included in the cluster analysis, then it seems to be 
alone and perhaps belongs to the group of the most “independent” nations (France, 
                                                 
11 In the regression used here when we added another variable of the exports ratio of each country to 
the USA we got a marginally significant coefficient for this variable, thus confirming the Atlantic 
connection of countries such as Ireland, Norway, Sweden and others. 
12 The hierarchical cluster analysis based on the Ward method and z-scores is used here (Hair et al, 
2006). Other methods provided similar results.   14
Sweden, Norway, Ireland as shown in Figure 2). Nonetheless Germany exports the 
bulk of its exports to its neighbours (France 10.9%, the UK 8.5%, Netherlands 6.2%, 
Italy 7.5%, Belgium 5.2%, Austria 5.4%, and Switzerland 4.4%, a total of 48%). This 
shows again the central position of Germany as per our hypothesis. 
 
For the other clusters (in Figure 1) some comments are necessary. The central 
European group Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Austria, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia (all of them to the east or south of Germany) seem to form a compact group 
with similar characteristics, either because of history (Hungary and Austria, or 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic), or because of former ex communist affiliation. 
Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia form another cluster as expected (the Balkan 
group). The Baltic and Scandinavian countries seem to form another large cluster 
although split into smaller sub-clusters (like Denmark, Finland, and Latvia); this is 
also as expected. 
 
However, one of these sub-clusters include France and Ireland; this is somehow a 
surprising result at least for France (Ireland as already mentioned above seems to have 
Atlantic connections, in the same way as Scandinavian countries do). Finally, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg are in the same cluster together with the UK, Italy 
and Spain. The UK’s integration position is not surprising but Spain’s and Italy’s are 
(in the same way as France was in the previous cluster). These “surprises” are easily 
explained: Spain, large parts of Italy and France seem to be located at unfavourable 
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Figure 1  Cluster analysis excluding Germany 
  
                         Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
 
    C A S E      0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  eCzech_R    3   òø 
  eHungary   10   òôòø 
  ePoland    18   òú ùòø 
  eAustria   25   ò÷ ó ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø 
  eSlovaki   20   òòò÷ ó                       ó 
  eSloveni   21   òòòòò÷                       ó 
  eLuxem     15   òûòòòø                       ùòòòòòø 
  eNetherl   16   ò÷   ó                       ó     ó 
  eBelgium    1   òòòûòôòø                     ó     ó 
  eItaly     12   òòò÷ ó ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷     ó 
  eSpain     22   òòòòò÷ ó                           ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòø 
  eUK        24   òòòòòòò÷                           ó             ó 
  eGreece     9   òòòûòø                             ó             ó 
  eRomania   19   òòò÷ ùòòòòòø                       ó             ó 
  eBulgari    2   òòòòò÷     ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷             ó 
  eCroatia    4   òòòòòòòòòòò÷                                     ó 
  eEsthoni    6   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòòûòòòòòòòòòø                       ó 
  eLithuan   14   òòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷         ó                       ó 
  eDenmark    5   òòòûòø                   ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷ 
  eFinland    7   òòò÷ ùòòòòòòòòòø         ó 
  eLatvia    13   òòòòò÷         ó         ó 
  eIreland   11   òòòûòòòø       ùòòòòòòòòò÷ 
  eNorway    17   òòò÷   ùòø     ó 
  eFrance     8   òòòòòòò÷ ùòòòòò÷ 
  eSweden    23   òòòòòòòòò÷ 
Note: This is a dendrogram using Ward Method and z-scores. 
 
The clustering results for exports
13 show that Germany is the country around which 
the local clusters are crowded in: the central European to its east and south flank, the 
Baltic and Scandinavian on the north and northeast, the Balkan group on its south east 
(at a bigger distance), and the western cluster on its northwest, and south west 
(although Italy is directly on its south). If Portugal is also included in the cluster 
                                                 
13 In terms of imports the results are again quite clear: approximately the same local clusters as for 
exports are formed.    16
analysis (see Figure 2), then the algorithm puts this country in the western group 
where Spain is (not a surprising result). If Germany is also included then it initially 
forms a cluster on its own and is then grouped with the sub cluster of France, Norway, 
Sweden, and Ireland. The results are seen in Figure 2.   
C 
 
Figure 2  Cluster analysis including Germany 
 
                          Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
 
    C A S E      0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  eCzech_R    4   òø 
  eHungary   11   òú 
  eAustria    1   òôòø 
  ePoland    19   òú ùòø 
  eSwitzer   26   ò÷ ó ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø 
  eSlovaki   22   òòò÷ ó                       ó 
  eSloveni   23   òòòòò÷                       ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø 
  eGreece    10   òòòûòø                       ó                   ó 
  eRomania   21   òòò÷ ùòòòø                   ó                   ó 
  eBulgari    3   òòòòò÷   ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                   ó 
  eCroatia    5   òòòòòòòòò÷                                       ó 
  eDenmark    6   òòòûòø                                           ó 
  eFinland    8   òòò÷ ùòòòòòòòòòòòø                               ó 
  eLatvia    14   òòòòò÷           ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòø         ó 
  eEsthoni    7   òòòòòòòòòòòòòûòòò÷                     ó         ó 
  eLithuan   15   òòòòòòòòòòòòò÷                         ó         ó 
  eBelgium    2   òòòø                                   ó         ó 
  eItaly     13   òòòôòòòø                               ó         ó 
  ePortuga   20   òòò÷   ó                               ùòòòòòòòòò÷ 
  eLuxem     16   òûòòòø ó                               ó 
  eNetherl   17   ò÷   ùòôòòòòòòòòòòòø                   ó 
  eSpain     24   òòòòò÷ ó           ó                   ó 
  eUK        27   òòòòòòò÷           ó                   ó 
  eIreland   12   òòòûòòòø           ùòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòòò÷ 
  eNorway    18   òòò÷   ùòø         ó 
  eFrance     9   òòòòòòò÷ ùòòòø     ó 
  eSweden    25   òòòòòòòòò÷   ùòòòòò÷ 
  eGermany   28   òòòòòòòòòòòòò÷ 
   17






































The next method we use to support our results is multidimentional scaling
14 
(ALSCAL algorithm as per SPSS program, see also Hair et al, 2006). We excluded 
Belarus for its extreme values (51% of its exports go to Russia and this is picked up 
by this method, hence “disturbing” the other countries), but all other countries are 
included. The results are shown in Figure 3. We can see that the various clusters as 
indicated by the cluster analysis are confirmed here. In addition, the C1 core countries 
are grouped almost together. Once more Turkey seems not to fit in the Balkan 
countries (this country has also many connections with its eastern, south, or northern 
neighbours like Russia, Israel, Iran, and Azerbaijian). 
 
Figure 3  Multidimentional scaling analysis 
  
4  Conclusions and policy implications 
The evidence from the foregoing analysis is appealing for a confirmation of 
propositions 1 to 4 outlined in section 2. More precisely, core C1 seems to be the 
                                                 
14 The model used is based on Euclidean distances between the variables of exports in terms of ratios 
and standardizing these ratios by z-scores.  Alternative models produce quite the same results with 
minor differences.     18
moving force of the European economic and social development but more importantly 
to be the most favoured region of Europe. The centre of this core, Germany (and 
perhaps Belgium) is the nation that takes advantage of the HT hypothesis the most. 
According to this hypothesis the positive externalities of European integration are 
tangling around Germany and its main allies Belgium, Netherlands, and parts of 
France and Italy (the initial founding nations of the EU). At the moment in Europe 
there is not any other major core such as the C1 one. If we fully accept this 
proposition then we can predict the consequences for the clusters around Germany. 
  
The central European cluster which is overwhelmingly a group of former communist 
countries will soon develop in a spontaneous way as a result of its close vicinity to CI 
core. Already this is happening with all countries belonging to this cluster. The Baltic 
subgroup is interacting in a positive way with both the Scandinavian sub cluster and 
the C1 core. Hence the Baltic group will also follow in economic development the 
Central European cluster. The problematic cluster is the Balkan group plus Turkey. 
These countries are the poorest in Europe and very far from C1 and far from other 
possible cores of development (for example a core that could be formed around the 
axis Moscow-Kiev or a Middle East core around Dubai/Iran). 
 
What are possible solutions for the Balkan cluster? As already hinted at in Proposition 
4 above, the only solution seems to be the creation of another centre of a core like C1 
inside the boundaries of the Balkan cluster. What are possible core centres? All the 
Balkan nations could be part of the new core centre (called C2) since these nations are 
not densely populated , and the ex Yugoslav nations could be the link between this 
new core and the C1 core as most of them are not far from C1. This is the only   19
solution for the Balkan states and has as a prerequisite a very sound political and 
cultural cooperation between all countries, something which is now perhaps more 
possible than ever before. 
 
It is then further proposed that all Balkan nations put as priority number one to 
develop their inter-links first before they develop other links with other countries 
further away. This also means that these nations must not regard their inclusion to the 
EU as the panacea to their problems. On the contrary this inclusion can only imply a 
very long and uncertain path to economic development because all the other clusters 
closer to the centre of C1 will be naturally first developed. The example of Greece can 
be illuminating: although it is the most advanced country in the Balkan area, its 
exports are lagging behind considerably as they still remain very low even after 25 
years of this nation being a member of the EU. 
 
From the political point of view, we suspect that all Balkan states are not aware of the 
severity of the problem in terms of the importance of core C1 and other cores which 
might eventually emerge as poles of growth in this part of the planet. We strongly 
suggest in the light of the analysis in this paper that the creation of the core C2 and 
another one based on the axis Moscow-Kiev are necessary conditions for a peaceful 
and prosperous economic development in larger Europe. Furthermore if we look at 
the past, we can see that Constantinople (now Istanbul) was the centre of a 
developmental core, probably the most important one (another one being the North of 
Italy, and so on) in Europe. This might be further evidence for our proposition for the 
support of the C2 core creation.      
   20 
Appendix  Matrix of exports ratios of all European nations  
 Aus  Bel Belg Bos Bulg  Cze  Croa  Den Est Finl Fra Fyr Ger Gre Hun Ire Ita Lat Lit Lux Net Nor Pol Por Rom Rus Slov Slon Spa Swe Swi Tur UK Ukr 
Aus  0 0.2 1.1 4.9 2.4 6.4 8.6 1.1 0.5 1.1 1.1 0.7 5.4 1 8.5 0.4 2.5 0.5 0.3 1.6 1.6 0.2 1.8 0.8 3.4 0 7.6 7.7 1.1 1 3.6 1.2 0.7 1.2 
B e l   0  0000  0   0 . 2  0 0 . 400000000 1 . 5 3 . 2  000 0 . 70000 0 . 200000   1 . 3  
Belg  1.7 0.5 0 0 6.8 2.3 0.8 1.7 1.4 2.9 8.4 0.8 5.2 1.6 2.4 14 2.9 1.1 2.2  13 11 2.8 3.4 4.5 1.7 0.7 2 0.9 3.6 4.8 2.1 2.2 6.3  0 
B o s   0 . 3  0000   0 . 2   1 6  0000 2 . 200 0 . 70000  0000000 0 . 1 4 . 400000  0  
Bulg 0.4 0 0 0 0  0.3  0.4 0 0 0 0 2.4 0 6.8 0.4 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 0 1.8 0.4 0.3 0.5 0 0 0 1.6 0  1.4 
Cze  3.2 0.5 0.6 0 0.6  0 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3 2.8 0.6 2.1 0.2 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.6 4.3 0 0.6 1.2 13 1.9 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.9 
Croa 1.2  0.2 0 23 0.6  0.6 0 0 0 0 0 6.2 0 0.4 1 0 0.9 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0 0.8 0 0.6 9.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Den  0.7 1.2 0.8 0 0.5 0.6 0.3  0 3.4 2.4 0.8 0.3 1.7 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.8 6.1 4.9 0.5 1.4 3.9 2.5 1 0 0 0.7 0.9 0.8 6.6 0.8 1.2 1.3  0 
Est  0  0.7 0 0 0 0 0  0.3 0 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.9 4.5 0 0 0.1 0.3 0 0 1.6 0 0 0 0.7 0 0 0 0 
Finl  0.6 0.2 0.6 0 0 0.4 0.2 3.6 23 0 0.6 0 1 0 0.8 0.4 0.5 2.8 1.6 0.7 1.1 1.7 0.7 0.4 0 4.4 0.7 0.2 0.5 5.8 0.6 0.5 0.9  0 
Fra  4.6 0.6 19 0.1 6 4.9  3 5.1 1.6 3.9 0 5.1 11 4.6 6 6.1 13 2.3 5.2  21 11 8.7 6.5 13 7.8 2 3.6 6 23 5.2 9.5 7.2 11 1.6 
F y r   0  000 2 . 4  0   1 . 2  000000300000  00000000 1 . 300000  0  
Ger  34  4.6 21 21 13 38 13 20 8.9 13 16 26 0 14 36 8.6 15 16 10 27 25 14 35 18 17 7.4 31 24 14 11 23 19 11  3.7 
Gre  0.7  0 0.7 0 11 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.9 1 17 0.8 0 0.4 0.4 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 1 0.2 0.3 0.4 2.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 1.4 0.6 0.9 2.3 0.7  0 
Hun  3.7 1.2 0.5 0 0.9 2.3 1.4 0.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.3 1.7 0.6 0 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.7 0 2.6 0.3 3.7 1.7 5 2.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 2.6 
Ire  0.3  0 0.7 0 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.7 0.8 0.5 0.7 0 0.6 0.4 0.4 0 0.6 1.3 0.5 0.3 1.3 0.8 0.3 0.6 0 1.1 0.1 0 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 7.6  0 
Ita  9.6 1.6 5.7 16 16 4.6  29 3.4 1.2 4.2 10 8.9 7.5 12 6 4.7 0 2.7 2.3 6.2 6.3 3.7 6.1 4.8 26 6.8 7.7 14 12 3.8 9 8.1 5 4.2 
Lat  0 3.8 0 0 0 0.2  0 0.3 8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10  0 0 0.2 0.7 0 0 1.1 0.2 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 1.2 
Lit  0 2.9 0 0 0 0.4  0 0.5 4.4 0.6 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 8.7 0 0.1 0 0.1 2.6 0 0 2.3 0.3 0.3 0 0.4 0 0 0  1 
Lux  0 0 0 1.1 0  0.2 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net  2.2 4.6 13 0 1.9 4.2 0.9 5.1 3 4.9 4.2 4.4 6.2 3 4.3 5.5 2.6 3.4 3.5 4.8 0 10 4.8 3.9 3.8 9.7 2.8 1.8 4 5.3 3.5 3.9 7.8 1.4 
Nor  0.4 0.3 0.4 0 0 0.4  0 6.5 3.2 2.6 0.4 0 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.5 2 2.3 0.4 1 0 2.2 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 9.1 0.4 0.4 1.1  0 
Pol  1.8 4.8 0.9 0 0.9 4.9 0.5 1.7 1 2 1.3 0 2.8 1.6 2.4 0.3 2 1.6 3.5 1.3 1.3 0.6 0 0.5 1 4.4 4.9 2.9 1.2 1.8 0.9 1.2 0.9 2.5 
Por  0.4 0 0.5 0 0 0 0  0.5 0 0.5 1.3 0 0.9 0 0 0.3 1 0 0 0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0 0 0 1.6 0 8.9 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.8 0 
Rom  1.3 0.5 0.2 0 3.5 0.7 0.4  0 0 0 0.5 0.1 0.6 2.9 2.6 0 1.7 0 0.1  0 0.3 0 0.9 0 0 0.8 1 0.9 0 0 0.2 2.2 0.3 1.7 
Rus  1.6  51 0.6 0 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.3 12 8.2 1 1.3 2 2.8 1.6 0.3 1.7 5.8 10 0.5 1.4 0.6 3 0 0.3 0 1.2 3.2 0.7 1.4 0.9 3.5 0.8  16 
Slov  1.5 0.2 0.2 0 0.3 8.2 0.4  0 0 0 0 0 0.9 0 2 0 0 0.3 0.1  0 0 0 1.7 0 0.3 1.6 0 1.5 0.4 0 0 0 0 1.5 
Slon  2 0 0 12 0.5  0.7  9.1 0 0 0 0 2 0.4 0 0.8 0 1 0 0  0.2 0 0 0.3 0 0.4 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spa  2.8 0.3 4.2 0 3.1 2.2 0.7 3.4 0.5 2.9 11 1.9 5 3.9 2.9 2.9 7.6 0.9 0.9 2.9 4.1 2.4 2.3 21 1.9 1.5 1.7 1.5 0 3.4 3.8 4.5 5.1 1.9 
Swe  1.2 0.7 1.5 0 0.6 1.2 0.8  14 13 11 1.5 0.6 2.2 1.1 3.4 1.5 1.1 11 4.2 1.5 2.1 7.4 3.8 1.5 0.6 1.1 0.8 1 1.2 0 1.3 1.2 2.2  0 
Swi  4.8  0 1.2 13 0.6 1.5 0.7 1.2 0.6 1.1 3.6 1.8 4.4 0.9 1.4 3.3 4.3 0.5 12 1.4 1.8 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.6 4.2 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.1 0 0.9 1.7  0 
Tur  0.9 0.3 0.8 0 9.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.8 1.1 3.1 1.5 4.3 0.7 0.4 2 0 1.7 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.7 0 5.4 3.7 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.8 1.3 0 1 6.2 
UK  4.8  11 9.8 0 3 5.5 1.6 9.1 3.8 8.7 10 3.3 8.5 8.2 4.8 19 7.6 16 6.5 6.2 11 22 5.4 10 7.1 4.6 2.2 2.3 11 7.9 5.3 9.4 0 2.7 
Ukr  0.3  2.9 0.1 0 0.9  0.5 0  0.2 0 0.4 0.1 0 0.3 0 0.5 0 0.2 0 1.8 0 0.1 0 1.1 0 0 7.4 0.6 0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1 0 
Note: Source is ITC except for Portugal and Ukraine. Figures are shown as percentages.   21
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